Welcome to the International Atomic Energy Agency of Valdosta State University’s Model United Nations Conference of 2015. My name is Connor Wyatt and this is my second year being a part of this conference. I have been a part of the Valdosta State Model UN team for two years. My degree will be in Political Science with a minor in Geography. I hope to continue my education in international relations to the doctoral level and plan on becoming a professor. I have attended the Southern Regional Model United Nations Conference, the National Model United Nations Conference, and the Florida Model United Nations Conference.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) focuses primarily on the peaceful applications of atomic energy including promoting safe and secure use of nuclear power. Nuclear technology is a tool that can be used for the betterment of mankind as long as there are safeguards in place to help ensure peace and safety for all.

The topics for the International Atomic Energy Agency are:

I. Addressing the international inspection regime in the Iran Nuclear Deal with the P5+1.
II. Improving the international response to nuclear disasters.
III. Combating possible proliferation of nuclear material in the Middle East.

This background guide should be used as a starting point to help delegates understand the topics that they will be discussing in committee. While this guide does provide the history and current events of each topic, much more information can and should be obtained by the delegates from other sources.

Each delegate is also required to submit a position paper which should be no longer than two full pages. The position paper should give a brief insight into their Member State’s history with each topic and its current political stance. For more information on the Valdosta State Model United Nations Conference, please refer to the teacher’s manual.

Good luck delegates!

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International Atomic Energy Agency

Committee Background

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957 in response to the deep fears and expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy, with its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The IAEA has two Regional Safeguards Offices located in Toronto, Canada and in Tokyo, Japan, as well as two liaison offices located in New York City, United States and in Geneva, Switzerland. The IAEA is uniquely focused on the atomic energy that can be used as a powerful tool or dangerous weapon. The Agency’s genesis was from United States President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953. As of September 2015, the Agency has a total of 165 members. The IAEA has three main bodies: the Board of Governors, the General Conference, and the Secretariat. The IAEA Board of Governors is composed of 35 Member States and are designated and elected by the General Conference. The Board of Governors generally meets five times per year, and during those meetings they examine and make recommendations to the General Conference on the IAEA’s accounts, program and budget, and considers applications for membership. The General Conference is the highest policy-making body of the IAEA. They approve the actions and budget passed on from the Board of Governors, the Director General and Member States. The Secretariat of the IAEA is the international body of staff tasked with running the Agency. It is made up of some 2,560 multidisciplinary professional and support staff from more than 100 countries. This body of the IAEA perform diverse duties from running projects that help countries bring fresh water to cites to helping scientists to better understand and protect the environment.

Mission Statement

1. Independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, in the United Nations family, that serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation
2. Assists its Member States, in the context of social and economic goals, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for various peaceful purposes, including the generation of electricity, and facilitates the transfer of such technology and knowledge in a sustainable manner to developing Member States
3. Develops nuclear safety standards and, based on these standards, promotes the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the environment against ionizing radiation
4. Verifies through its inspection system that States comply with their commitments, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes

**Mandate**

The International Atomic Energy Agency assists its Member States, in the context of social and economic goals, in planning for and using nuclear science and technology for various peaceful purposes, including the generation of electricity, and facilitates the transfer of such technology and knowledge in a sustainable manner to developing Member States. It develops nuclear safety standards and, based on these standards, promotes the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the environment against ionizing radiation.

**Three Pillars of the IAEA**

1. **Science and Technology**

   The IAEA works to mobilize peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology for critical needs in developing countries. For scientific and technical cooperation in nuclear fields, the IAEA works to contribute to fighting poverty, sickness, and pollution of the Earth’s environment, and to other global “Millennium Goals” for a safer and better future. The main areas of activities are technical cooperation, research and development, and energy and electricity. The IAEA supports cooperative projects achieving tangible social and economic benefits for people in developing countries. Jointly with institutes and laboratories worldwide, the IAEA supports research and development on critical problems facing developing countries. Some targeted works include food, health, water, and environmental areas where nuclear and radiation technologies can make a difference. The IAEA helps countries assess and plan their energy needs, including nuclear generation of electricity. Major emphasis is placed on the role of “innovative” and advanced technologies vital to meeting the world’s rising energy needs. Where they hold comparative advantages, nuclear science and technology have become preferred solutions—and sometimes the only solutions—to many problems hindering development in poorer countries. Three IAEA Departments lead programs in fields of nuclear science and technology: Department of Technical Cooperation; Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications; and Department of Nuclear Energy.

2. **Safety and Security**

   The IAEA works to protect people and the environment from harmful radiation exposure. The Agency helps countries enhance their nuclear safety and prepare for and respond to emergencies. For safety, they cover nuclear installations, radioactive sources, radioactive
material in transport, and radioactive waste. For security, they cover nuclear and radioactive materials, as well as nuclear installations. The focus is to help Member States prevent, detect, and respond to terrorist or other malicious acts such as illegal possession, use, transfer, trafficking, and to protect nuclear installations and transport against sabotage. The IAEA’s work has set the framework for cooperative efforts to build and strengthen an international safety and security regime. This framework includes (1) advisory international standards, codes, and guides; (2) binding international conventions; (3) international peer reviews to evaluate national operations, capabilities, and infrastructures; (4) and an international system emergency preparedness and response. The authority under the IAEA is the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security.

3. Safeguards and Verification

The IAEA works to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is the world’s nuclear inspectorate with more than four decades of verification experience. Inspectors work to verify that safeguarded nuclear material and activates are not used for military purpose. The Agency is additionally responsible for the nuclear file in Iraq as mandated by the UN Security Council. The IAEA inspects nuclear and related facilities under safeguards agreements with more than 140 States. Most agreements are with States that have internationally committed themselves not to possess nuclear weapons. They are bound by the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), for which the IAEA is the verification authority. Promoting verification under UN Security Council resolutions, the IAEA is the inspectorate for nuclear-related monitoring and verification, especially those in Iraq which is carried out through the IAEA’s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO).

Topic Overviews

The international inspection regime of the Iran Nuclear Deal will rely heavily on IAEA support and experts. The relationship between the IAEA and Iranian nuclear agencies has been cold in the past, but relations have warmed since the election of Rouhani.

While nuclear disasters occur very infrequently, their impacts can be incredibly devastating. With the recent disaster Fukushima nuclear plant, this topic has been thrown into sharp focus. Nuclear power plants are being built in Member States at an increasing rate, and the IAEA needs to have a swift, efficient response prepared for any nuclear incidents that may occur, no matter how unlikely they may be.

Nuclear proliferation has been a cause for concern since the end of World War II. As a region rife with conflict and rivalries, the Middle East has presented unique challenges to the international community especially when the potential for nuclear proliferation is present.
Topic I: Addressing the international inspection regime in the Iran Nuclear Deal with the P5+1.

“Let’s not mince words: The choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy and some form of war — maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon.” – Barack Obama

Background of Iran Nuclear Deal with P5+1

Iran’s nuclear ambitions began with the Shah of Iran who created the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1973. While the US and France both supported the program at its onset, both countries grew suspicious of Iran’s true motives by the late 1970’s. With the Islamic Revolution, Iran lost interest in nuclear technology as many imams and clerics disapproved of its use. This position was reversed during the Iran-Iraq War due to Saddam Hussein’s own pursuit of nuclear weapons. Ayatollah Khomeini secretly restarted Iran’s nuclear program at the Bushehr complex as a contingency for Iraq obtaining nuclear weapons. Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Abdul Qareem Khan of Pakistan sold Iran uranium enrichment technology, propelling the program forward by years¹. In the 1990s, suspicions grew around Iran’s nuclear ambitions leading to a sanction regime aimed at decreasing the possibility of Iran gaining nuclear weapons. In 2002, a group of Iranian dissidents leaked classified documents detailing the true extent of the Iranian nuclear program. A large uranium enrichment plant was located in Natanz, and a heavy water plant was located in Arak. Both of these locations were previously unknown to the UN and IAEA. After the discovery, Iran submitted to inspections by the IAEA. The next year, Iran suspended parts of its nuclear program closely related to weaponization. That same year, the IAEA discovered highly enriched uranium in Natanz. A conference with several European powers took place, and Iran accepted a stricter inspections regime and pledged to end its enrichment of uranium. Iran violated the new agreement in 2004 after claiming that the European countries failed to provide economic incentives to sustain the agreement. After a short round of negotiations, Iran agreed to a temporary suspension of its nuclear program with the exception of 20 centrifuges to be used for research. In 2005, a questionable intelligence leak made some countries believe that Iran is certainly seeking nuclear weapons¹.

In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran. Ahmadinejad flagrantly defied the UN Security Council and IAEA by restarting production in Natanz almost immediately after taking office and opening a new heavy water plant in Arak the next year. The UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions to try to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In 2008, the US and Israel began covertly sabotaging Iranian computer systems within Natanz. The cyberattacks successfully erased much technological progress and damaged many integral parts of the facility including centrifuges. Later that year, high-level talks that included both the US and Iran failed to make any substantive progress on the topic. Iranian diplomats maintained that to Iran, the issue was nonnegotiable. Regular talks were scheduled between Iran and the US, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, China, and France (P5+1)². In late 2009, the US, the UK, and France declassified several documents stating that Iran was secretly constructing a nuclear
facility under a mountain. The documents put the Iranian break out period at five years. The next year, the UN Security Council placed its fourth round of sanctions on Iran. In 2012, after years of sanction, the Iranian rial lost 50% of its value. Ahmadinejad continued to be defiant in the face of sanctions and continued to bolster the nuclear program. Israel began an open dialogue about possible strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities if breakout is suspected.

After years of economy crippling sanctions, frustrated Iranians elected a reform minded cleric named Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani promptly replaced all hardliners in his administration including the head of the Iranian nuclear agency and Iran’s ambassador the IAEA. Iran began slowing its nuclear programs in preparation to begin a dialogue about removal of sanctions. Talks between the P5+1 and Iran began showing signs of progress that ultimately led to the current nuclear deal.

Current Situation

The P5+1 (China, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France, and Germany), the European Union, and Iran reached a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) aimed at ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program remains wholly peaceful. The JCPOA went into effect on October 18, 2015, and participants have made necessary preparations for the application of their JCPOA commitments. Iran, along with the rest of the involved parties, welcome this historic deal, as Iran has pledged that under no circumstances will Iran’s program ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons—illustrating what Iran describes as a fundamental shift in its nuclear program, focusing on regional contributions to international peace and security. Iran envisions that, in accordance with the JCPOA parameters it can work toward building a higher degree of confidence from the global community and encouraging international cooperation. Keeping Iran’s cap on enrichment at 3.67 percent, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finds Iran in compliance with the Deal, and has opted to move forward.

Of course, this is not without a degree of mistrust. An inspection regime has been established to oversee enrichment activities and commercial programs to ensure that they remain consistent and up to date with international nonproliferation norms. Some safeguards include provisions stating that for the first 8 years, limitations will be placed on specific research and development (R&D) activities concerning enrichment of uranium, that is to say, Iran will carry out its R&D activities in a manner that does not accrue enriched forms of uranium, except for the manufacturing and assembly of IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges, as outlined in Annex I of the JCPOA.

After a 10 year period, Iran will begin to phase out IR-1 centrifuges. In the meantime, the Iranian Nuclear Program will be allowed a total installed uranium capacity of up to 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. During this time, the IAEA will be requested to continuously monitor and verify the
voluntary nuclear-related measures employed by Iran. After 15 years, Iran will gradually move toward meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel production and other domestic industries. During this time, the Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation.

Iran has agreed to allow the IAEA to monitor its implementation of voluntary measures and to implement transparency measures, as set out in the JCPOA.

These precautionary measures include the following:

1. Long-term IAEA presence in Iran in which uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants is closely monitored for 25 years.

2. Monitoring of containment and surveillance of centrifuges for 20 years.

3. Ensuring the use of IAEA-approved and certified modern technologies, including online enrichment measurement and electronic seals.

4. A reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex II.

Iran also agrees not to engage in activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities. Furthermore, Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the JCPOA, as endorsed by the UN Security Council.

In the event that Iran does not hold up its end of the Nuclear Deal, economic and financial sanctions will be employed. Some of these include joint-measures of freezing the transfer of funds between American and European institutions and Iranian persons and entities, including financial and banking institutions. Additionally, reactionary measures may include economic sanctions on financial support for trade with Iran, including on export credit, guarantees, insurance, and concession loans. Involved parties also agree to halt the importation and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, and petrochemical products. Military agreements such as the transfer of naval vessels and other cargo also stand to be scaled back in the event of Iran’s failure to meet the agreed-upon standards.

**Committee Directive**

Delegates should be prepared to portray their Member State’s position in regards to the Iran Nuclear Deal and the resulting inspection regime. The goal is to create an inspection regime that is as effective as possible while adhering to the guidelines that have already been established between the P5+1 and Iran.
Topic II: Improving the international response to nuclear disasters

“What might be considered one of the few positive aspects of 'Chernobyl's legacy' is today's global safety regime.” - Mohamed ElBaradei

History of the International Response to Nuclear Disaster

Not long after the IAEA was established it was clear there needed to be guidelines on how the world should react to any potential nuclear disasters, and as such the emergency preparedness and response (EPR) capabilities were created. These included preemptive measures such as appropriate safety standards, providing training for the implementation of the IAEA safety standards, supporting member states in their path to building safe nuclear power plants, conducting exercises in order to evaluate and improve response arrangements and capabilities. These were expanded upon greatly following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 and once again following the Fukushima disaster of 2011.

In 1989, the IAEA faced its first major test with the Chernobyl nuclear disaster after being asked by the government of the Soviet Union to “organize and coordinate an assessment of the guidance given by the Soviet authorities to persons living in radiologically contaminated areas, and to evaluate measures taken to safeguard the health of the population”. Over 200 scientists from 25 countries came together to form the project on the “Radiological Consequences in the USSR of the Chernobyl Accident: Assessment of Health and Environmental Effects and Evaluation of Protective Measures”, or the “International Chernobyl Project” for short. One of the key focuses of the “International Chernobyl Project” was the mapping of the most heavily contaminated areas and ensuring that the public was aware of the contamination zones. Two maps were created to show the most heavily irradiated areas, the first showed “Distribution of Surface Ground Contamination by Caesium-137” and the second showed “Distribution of Surface Ground Contamination by Strontium-90”. In 1995 nearly a decade after the Chernobyl incident, the IAEA convened an international group to assess the long term environmental and social consequences of the reactor meltdown.

In 2001, two separate scientific conferences were held in Kiev, Ukraine, the first called “Fifteen Years after the Chernobyl Accident. Lessons Learned”, and the second was called the “Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident: Results of the 15-year follow-up Studies”. The first conference was meant to discuss the lessons learned from the incident, and how the international community should “respond to nuclear and radiation safety, emergency preparedness, response, status and future of the shelter and the exclusion zone, radiation health and environmental effects”. The second conference was focused entirely on the health effects of the accident, and discussed the lessons learned on how to deal with medical issues as a result of the nuclear radiation.

Because of the years of research and planning that followed the Chernobyl incident, the IAEA was far more prepared for the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown than they would
have been otherwise. Knowing how quickly radiation can spread, the IAEA quickly acted to evacuate the 100,000 people who lived within the projected radiation zone. The IAEA was very fast in their response because, unlike the Chernobyl incident, the world was made aware almost immediately of the damage. Following the disaster, a 240 page report was compiled that assessed the causes and consequences of the accident, which was due to a tsunami triggered by an earthquake, unlike the Chernobyl incident which was largely due to human error and lack of commitment to safety standards. The Fukushima Daiichi incident made it abundantly clear how vulnerable nuclear power plants are to natural disasters and that relevant agencies need to plan for how to prevent any future incidents caused by natural disasters. The Director General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, said after the disaster, “There can be no grounds for complacency about nuclear safety in any country,” and he announced that the IAEA needs to focus on preventing future accidents and mitigating the effects of accidents. It was determined that part of what allowed the damage to reach the levels that it did was the consensus that an “accident of such magnitude was simply unthinkable”. Because this assumption was so widely accepted, Japan was not nearly prepared for a nuclear accident as severe as the 2011 incident.

Since the Fukushima Daiichi incident, nations all over the world have carried out “stress tests” to make sure their nuclear power plants are actually secure against natural disasters of all kinds. Within a few months of the disaster, Member States unanimously endorsed the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which was a comprehensive program meant to reinforce nuclear safety across the planet. The Action Plan on Nuclear Safety is meant to consolidate “peer reviews, emergency preparedness and response, regulatory frameworks, remediation and decommissioning, capacity building, as well as the protection of people and the environment”.

The Fukushima Daiichi disaster has brought focus on the problem of nuclear safety to the forefront of the world, and was the catalyst to bring about much needed change and improvements to how nations develop their nuclear power plants. The IAEA has expanded beyond its original purpose of creating guidelines to include “providing analysis of a nuclear emergency’s potential consequences and presenting possible scenarios on how it could develop. It has also strengthened its peer review program, and can advise countries on how to improve their own nuclear safety”.

Current Situation

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fulfills its role of emergency response through its Incident and Emergency System (IES). Additionally, the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) serves as a global focal point for emergency preparedness, as well as response. Due to the imperative need for preparation to better respond to situations with potential radiological consequences to health, property or the environment, the Agency relies on the competent, experienced personnel to respond timely and effectively within the response roles.
For safe measure, the IEC maintains a 24-hour contact point for notification and requests for assistance. To maintain the responsibility of preparedness in the wake of disasters, the IEC employs an array of policies, including the following:

1. Developing appropriate safety standards relating to preparedness for and response to nuclear or radiological incidents and emergencies.

2. Developing technical tools for the application of the IAEA Safety Standards.

3. Providing training for the implementation of the IAEA Safety Standards.

4. Supporting Member States to strengthen and maintain their response capabilities at any level (i.e. operator, local, regional, national and, where appropriate, international).

5. Providing appraisal services (Emergency Preparedness Review Missions: EPREV) in Member States to assess national EPR arrangements and capabilities and to contribute to establishing and enhancing their arrangements and capabilities consistent with the Safety Standards.

6. Conducting exercises in order to evaluate and improve response arrangements and capabilities.

As outlined by the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, IAEA functions include: collecting and disseminating information concerning methodologies, techniques and available results of research relating to response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies; assist with preparing emergency plans and the appropriate legislation; developing training programs for personnel to deal with nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies; and developing appropriate radiation monitoring programs, procedures and standards. By adhering to the aforementioned IEC policies, the mandated functions serve to be upheld and provide for a more efficient response to any potential nuclear disasters.

Following the 2011 Japanese nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiichi, response across the globe, in addition to the IAEA, has included World Meteorological Organization and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, which has radiation detection equipment deployed around the world. Citing this particular disaster, environmental activists at a United Nations meeting in April 2011 "urged bolder steps to tap renewable energy so the world doesn't have to choose between the dangers of nuclear power and the ravages of climate change."

Committee Directive

The committee's goal for this topic will be to help the world be more prepared to face the consequences of a nuclear disaster. The world's response to nuclear disasters in the past has been disjointed and inefficient, but delegates should strive to strengthen the
international community’s ability to respond to nuclear disasters while maintaining their Member State’s position.

**Topic III: Combating possible proliferation of nuclear material in the Middle East**

“I have to bring to your notice a terrifying reality: with the development of nuclear weapons, Man has acquired, for the first time in history, the technical means to destroy the whole of civilization in a single act.” – Joseph Rotblat

**Background**

The UN defines the Middle East region as “all members of the Arab League, Iran, and Israel.” This region is deeply divided both religiously and politically as differences between Shia and Shiite Muslims cause constant conflicts. The importance of the region’s natural resources means every conflict is center stage in world politics thus creating scenarios where world powers invest billions of dollars annually to assure stability. The fragility of the region makes it a serious concern if WMDs were to be introduced. Because of this, creating a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (MENWFZ) is an important issue that faces the UN and the IAEA.

Nuclear weapon free zones have been established in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia. All five treaties cover large inhabited areas and are designed to ensure total absence of nuclear weapons from the territories. They also provide for IAEA verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material and for the establishment of regional mechanisms to deal with compliance problems along with protocol for member states to adopt the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The NPT was created in 1968 and is considered to be the most creditable international agreement in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The effort to create a MENFWZ began in 1974 when Egypt and Iran introduced a draft resolution of such a zone before to the UN General Assembly. The zone has not been established yet despite all Middle East states signing the NPT.

Four countries in the Middle East have been found in non-compliance of the NPT: Iraq, Libya, Iran, and Syria. Of these cases, Iran and Syria remain unresolved. Israel is the only known state in the region with possession of a nuclear arsenal but since they have had the arsenal since the 1950’s, they were grandfathered into the NPT. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria’s aspirations for nuclear weapons and their use of chemical and biological weapons were clear violations of the NPT. The negligence of the Middle Eastern states to comply with signed treaties creates an even more urgent situation.

Negotiations for a MENFWZ have been ongoing since 1974. Since then, numerous conventions have been held and treaties have been drafted. In 1995, a MENFWZ was very close
to agreement when the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia were all sponsors of a resolution. The resolution failed but has been made the model for recent negotiations. In 2010, the states agreed to five practical steps to implement the 1995 resolution. However, because of the complicated political atmosphere surrounding the Middle East, no agreement has been reached\textsuperscript{15}. In order for a MENFWZ to be in effect, all IAEA and Middle East member states must agree on a single treaty but non-compliance by just one member can halt negotiations. As seen countless times in the forty-year history of MENFWZ negotiations, non-compliance with treaty talks is the biggest problem that faces the IAEA.

**Current Situation**

On July 20, 2015, The UN Security Council unanimously adopted the Iran Deal, which is a resolution to establish a monitoring system for the nuclear program of Iran. The resolution provides for an eventual removal of all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, and holds that the IAEA will continue to verify the compliance of Iran on their commitments regarding nuclear materials under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Security Council requests the IAEA’s Director General “to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” The main points of the deal regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions are: Iran will give up 2/3 of their ability to enrich uranium and that all but 6,000 of their 19,500 centrifuges will be stored and monitored by the IAEA\textsuperscript{17}. They will export all but 300kg of their stockpile of low-enriched uranium. Their enrichment plants and nuclear sites will be monitored, subjected to inspections, and ultimately remodeled to other research centers. Iran will have to implement the safeguards agreement, “Additional Protocol” which gives IAEA inspectors more powers to monitor Iran’s facilities and nuclear plants. After the IAEA can confirm that Iran has followed these guidelines, sanctions against Iran regarding nuclear materials will be lifted, and Iran will remain subject to a United Nations arms embargo for five years, and their ballistic missile program restrictions will remain for eight years\textsuperscript{18}. However, if Iran disobeys any of the resolution’s rules, the sanctions will be placed back on them, and other means of punishment can occur\textsuperscript{19}.

The Director General of the IAEA issued an “Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East” on July 28, 2015. In operative paragraph 4 of the General Conference Resolution GC (58)/RES/16, affirmed “the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ)\textsuperscript{18}. In operative paragraph 5, it called upon each party that is directly concerned, as well as all States in the region to seriously consider cooperating and taking the appropriate and practical steps necessary for the implementation of the proposal to establish an effectively and mutually verifiable NWFZ in the Middle East.
Requested by the General Conference, this report describes the steps that the Director General has undergone in his efforts to implement his mandates conferred by the GC (58)/RES/16 and its decision GC (44)/DEC/12. Notwithstanding the continuing broad support for the view that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime would be further strengthened through the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, the requests of the General Conference for model safeguards agreements require agreement among the Member States in the region on the material obligations that those States are prepared to assume as part of an NWFZ agreement in the Middle East region. While there remains a lack of agreement among some Middle Eastern States on the modalities and substance of an agreement to establish the Middle East as a NWFZ, the Director General and the Secretariat will continue to work and consult with the states in the region to reach a common ground necessary to develop the model agreements as an essential step towards establishing the Middle East as a NWFZ.

The Review Conference of 2015 of the Parties to the NPT was held in New York by the United Nations from April 27, 2015 to May 22, 2015. Article VIII of the Treaty envisages a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, which was a provision reaffirmed by the States parties at the NPT Review and Extension Conference of 1995 and the NPT Review Conference of 2000. At the NPT Review Conference of 2015, the implementations of the Treaty’s provisions since 2010 were examined. The Conference was not able to come to an agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document, despite intensive consultations.

Committee Directive

The committee’s goal will be to reduce the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Delegates should be prepared to minimize the possibility of the spread of nuclear arms in the Middle East while still respecting the sovereignty of Middle Eastern Member States. Delegates should be prepared to maintain their Member State’s positions on the topic, no matter how controversial.
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